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Transnational Affinities and Invented Traditions: 
The Napoleonic Wars in British and Hanoverian 
Memory, 1815–1915*
Thomas Hardy, arguably the foremost English novelist of the early 
twentieth century, often drew on the past for inspiration. He spent long 
hours in the British Museum researching accounts of the Napoleonic 
Wars, so as to lend an air of authenticity to the historical backdrop 
of his writings. Although Hardy’s trademark descriptions of life in 
the fictitious county of Wessex are quintessentially English, they also 
reflect a fascination with the real-life German recruits who had left 
their fatherland to fight Napoleon under British colours. in contrast 
to a plethora of earlier Jacobite, Whig and Radical pamphleteers, he 
did not see the stationing of foreign mercenaries on British soil as 
an oppressive threat to the liberties of the English people, but rather 
imagined the King’s German Legion (1803–16) as a benign, albeit 
exotic, experiment in transnational bonding. A  novella in which he 
first developed this idea, The Melancholy Hussar of the German Legion 
(1890), tells the story of a young woman who falls unhappily in love 
with a glamorous corporal of the eponymous unit, an ‘ideal being … 
with none of the appurtenances of an ordinary house dweller’.1 The 
tale of the two lovers struck a chord with newspaper publishers, who 
considered it commercial enough to be advertised as a ‘brilliant story 
of the last century’.2
The Melancholy Hussar betrayed subtle traces of the transnational 
cultural contact that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
(1792–1815) had left behind in the British imagination. The apparent 
longevity of this memory and Hardy’s contextualisation of his story in 
a literary discourse of melancholic loss interlock with historians’ claims 
about the singular historical significance of the war experience.3 For 
Reinhart Koselleck, the Revolutionary period heralded a decline of 
*The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of the English Historical Review, 
Brendan Simms, T.c.W. Blanning, Torsten Riotte and Andreas Stucki for their helpful criticism 
during the preparation of this article.
1. Thomas Hardy, The Melancholy Hussar of the German Legion and Other Stories (London, 
2005), p. 119; G. Harvey, Thomas Hardy (Oxford and New York, 2003), pp. 38, 115–16.
2. The Yorkshire Herald, 15 Nov. 1890, ‘A Brilliant Story of the Last century’. For an 
analysis of Hardy’s readership, see T.R. Wright, Hardy and His Readers (Basingstoke, 2003), 
esp. pp. 9–27.
3. i follow Kieran Klaus Patel here in defining ‘transnational’ as dialectic relationships 
between two or more national societies beyond the realm of pure diplomacy: K.K. Patel, 
‘Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte’, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, lii 
(2004), pp. 632–3.
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people’s ‘space of experience’ (that knowledge which could be usefully 
applied from the past) in inverse relationship to the widening of their 
‘horizon of expectation’ (the uncertain possibility of the not-yet).4 This 
rupture in the flow of time, the literary scholar Richard Terdiman 
adds, precipitated a ‘memory crisis’ that resulted in the alienation of 
Europeans from their heritage, and in an obsession with recovering the 
past.5 Not long ago, Peter Fritzsche went a step further by emphasising 
the pervasiveness of ruptured memory in order to accentuate the 
transcontinental connections formed by nostalgia across Europe and 
North America.6
The literary texts and memoirs that Terdiman and Fritzsche rely on 
for their arguments raise further questions about the functioning of the 
social and institutional frameworks within which ideas about nostalgia, as 
well as positive experiences of modernity, were articulated.7 Scholarship 
in the vein of the Anglo-German collaborative research project ‘The 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in European Experiences and 
Memories’ has recently begun to explore how the complex interplay 
of economic, social and mental factors influenced both popular 
perceptions of the wars against France and their long-term aftermath in 
collective memory.8 What remains a matter of contention is the agency 
and formative power of nationalist ideologies. There is a sense, as 
Fritzsche notes, that many of the alienated inhabitants of the nineteenth 
century sought solace in xenophobia and turned against the intellectual 
exchanges that had been characteristic of the Enlightenment.9 This claim 
derives from an unspoken, intuitive rather than rational, assumption 
based on the early appropriation of the anti-Napoleonic struggle by 
nationalist causes outside France. The nationalisation of memory has 
proved self-perpetuating in generating a privileged heuristic status for 
the nation-state at the expense of alternative perspectives, as the state 
of research on the battles of Leipzig (1813) and Waterloo (1815) makes 
4. R. Koselleck, ‘Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos into the Perspective 
of a Modernised Historical Process’, in id., Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, tr. 
K. Tribe (cambridge, MA, 1985), pp. 21–39. On the perceived acceleration of historical time in 
the nineteenth century, see also R.A. Vieira, ‘connecting the New Political History with Recent 
Theories of Temporal Acceleration: Speed, Politics, and the cultural imagination in fin de siècle 
Britain’, History and Theory, l (2011), pp. 373–89.
5. R. Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis (ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 3.
6. P. Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History 
(cambridge, MA, 2004), esp. p. 204.
7. On this point, cf. M. Levinger, ‘The Birth of Modern Memory’, Modern Intellectual History, 
iii (2006), p. 177; P. Mandler, review of Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present, ante, cxxi (2006), p. 122.
8. A. Forrest, E.  François, and K.  Hagemann, eds., War Memories: The Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture (Basingstoke, 2012). For more detailed information 
about the participants, publications, and conferences, see the project website at the York University 
centre for Eighteenth century Studies, http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/cecs/resprojects/nbi2.htm. 
Unfortunately, the German website has been taken down since the end of the project in 2009.
9. Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present, p. 129.
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clear: despite having been won by coalitions, a substantial and fairly 
fresh body of publications concentrates on the two battles’ emblematic 
function in German and British national mythology respectively.10
in stark contrast, diplomatic historians have long accepted the 
centripetal quality of Allied coalition-building in 1813–15, which, 
in the words of Paul W.  Schroeder, constituted nothing less than 
the turning point in the transformation of European international 
politics from a ‘competitive and conflictual balance of power’ to a 
more peaceful ‘nineteenth-century concert and equilibrium’.11 
Moreover, the new interest in histoire croisée and cultural-transfer 
analysis has generated a plethora of studies on various aspects of the 
Anglo-German relationship, from immigration patterns to student 
pacifism, showing that Britain and Germany were ‘less internally 
coherent and more externally open-ended’ than previous work treating 
the nation-state as the self-evident unit of enquiry would suggest.12 
The existing literature, however, has been less successful at reconciling 
the substantial evidence of cultural entanglements and good will on 
the one hand with the xenophobic tendencies of post-Napoleonic 
memory and the escalation of political antagonism on the other. in 
the case of Britain and Germany, the key question as to why the two 
nations went to war with one another in 1914 despite their various 
entwinements still demands more conclusive answers.13
10. For a representative sampling, see K.A. Schäfer, ‘Die Völkerschlacht’, in E. François and 
H.  Schulze, eds., Deutsche Erinnerungsorte (3 vols., Munich, 2001–2), ii. 187–8; W.  Siemann, 
‘Krieg und Frieden in historischen Gedenkfeiern des Jahres 1913’, in D. Düding, P. Friedemann 
and P. Münch, eds., Öffentliche Festkultur: Politische Feste in Deutschland von der Aufklärung 
bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (Reinbek, 1988), pp. 298–320; U. Schneider, Politische Festkultur im 19. 
Jahrhundert: Die Rheinprovinz von der französischen Zeit bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges 
(1806–1918) (Essen, 1995), pp. 52–65, 332–6; S.-L. Hoffmann, ‘Mythos und Geschichte: Leipziger 
Gedenkfeiern der Völkerschlacht im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert’, in E. François, H. Siegrist 
and J. Vogel, eds., Nation und Emotion: Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich im 19. und 
20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1995), pp. 111–32; L. colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837 
(New Haven and London, 1992), pp. 364–7; P. Shaw, Waterloo and the Romantic Imagination 
(Basingstoke, 2002), p. 2. Although Jeremy Black gives the Waterloo commemorations of Britain’s 
allies their due, his recently published reflections on the great battle nevertheless adopt an all 
too familiar stance in positing that ‘Waterloo was an iconic battle for the British, a triumph of 
endurance that ensured a nineteenth-century world in which Britain played the key role’: J. Black, 
The Battle of Waterloo: A New History (cambridge, 2010), p. xi.
11. P.W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848 (Oxford, 1996), p. v.
12. D. Blackbourn, ‘“As Dependent on Each Other as Man and Wife”: cultural contacts and 
Transfers’, in D. Geppert and R. Gerwarth, eds., Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: 
Essays on Cultural Affinity (Oxford, 2008), p. 18.
13. J. Rüger, ‘Revisiting the Anglo-German Antagonism’, Journal of Modern History, lxxxiii 
(2011), pp.  579–617, esp. p.  585. Rüger provides an excellent survey of the latest literature on 
Anglo-German history. See also P. Major, ‘Britain and Germany: A Love-Hate Relationship?’ and 
A. Fahrmeir, ‘New Perspectives in Anglo-German comparative History’, both in German History, 
xxvi (2008), pp. 553–62 and 457–68. On the particularly pronounced simultaneity of cooperation 
and antagonism in the field of German and British colonial politics, see U. Lindner, ‘imperialism 
and Globalization: Entanglements and interactions between the British and German colonial 
Empires in Africa before the First World War’, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London, 
xxxii (2010), pp. 4–28.
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The present article argues that the memory cultures of Britain and 
Hanover shed new light on long-term dynamics of cooperation and 
alienation that gave rise to these fateful dichotomies in Anglo-German 
history. For 123  years (1714–1837) England had closer relations with 
Hanover than with any other continental European state while the two 
monarchies were ruled in personal union under the House of Guelph. 
T.c.W. Blanning, Brendan Simms and a small cohort of younger 
historians have uncovered many important aspects of the diplomatic, 
religious, scientific, economic and cultural links that emerged from 
what was initially a dynastic marriage of convenience, but as yet we 
know little about the afterlife of this bilateral heritage.14 Such reticence 
belies the richness of Anglo-Hanoverian dialogue in the realm of 
memory, and, more particularly, the ways in which transnational 
remembrance shaped the two societies even after the formal dissolution 
of the personal union with the death in 1837 of the last male monarch 
to inherit both crowns, William iV. it will be seen that their close 
collaboration in the wars against Napoleon conditioned not only how 
Britons and Hanoverians related to each other but also their respective 
histories. Rather than being mutually exclusive, internationalism and 
nationalism both moulded the process of historical remembrance well 
into the First World War.
To make sense of these developments and their ultimately alienating 
effect on Anglo-Hanoverian relations, Jan and Aleida Assmann’s 
distinction between ‘communicative’ and ‘cultural’ memory offers a 
useful starting point. The former concept designates the living, embodied 
memory of social groups with first-hand knowledge of certain historic 
events. The Anglo-Hanoverian veterans of the duke of Wellington’s army 
and their dependants partook of the same communicative memory for 
as long as the immediacy of the Napoleonic war experiences remained 
vibrant. When these personal networks faded away with the passing 
of their members, Waterloo entered the domain of cultural memory, 
an abstract mode of commemoration more reliant on mediation 
through official rituals and symbols that were liable to semantic 
change. This is not to say that the transition from one ontological 
state to the other was predetermined, because any attempt to apply 
Jan and Aleida Assmann’s binary model in a schematic fashion would 
14. T.c.W. Blanning, ‘“That Horrid Electorate” or “Ma patrie germanique”? George iii, 
Hanover and the Fürstenbund of 1785’, The Historical Journal, xx (1977), pp. 311–44; B. Simms, 
Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714–1783 (London, 
2007); N.B. Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, 1700–1837 (Woodbridge, 2007); T. Riotte, 
Hannover in der britischen Politik (1792–1815) (Münster, 2005); A.c. Thompson, Britain, Hanover 
and the Protestant Interest, 1688–1756 (Woodbridge, 2006); H.  Smith, Georgian Monarchy: 
Politics and Culture, 1714–1760 (cambridge, 2006); P.H.H. Draeger, ‘Great Britain and Hanover, 
1830–66’, (Univ. of cambridge Ph.D.  thesis, 1998). For an overview of recent scholarship on 
Anglo-Hanoverian relations, see B.  Simms and T. Riotte, eds., The Hanoverian Dimension in 
British History, 1714–1837 (cambridge, 2007).
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risk distorting the complex dialectic between strategic forgetting and 
preservation that defined Anglo-Hanoverian memory. Yet introducing 
communicative and cultural memory loosely as overarching analytical 
categories helps to focus attention on some of the varied issues that 
this article addresses.15 The first part engages with the development 
of an Anglo-Hanoverian social space against the background of the 
two countries’ political relationship in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The second section expands on this social theme by examining 
more closely manifestations of an Anglo-Hanoverian communicative 
memory in charities for war victims and the collaboration of veterans 
in claiming public recognition for their wartime service. The third 
and longest section endeavours to account for the profoundness of 
Anglo-Hanoverian estrangement that nevertheless came to characterise 
both societies’ attitudes to their military heritage in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, as demonstrated by debates in Britain about 
foreign enlistment during the crimean War (1854–6) and Hanoverian 
responses to the reinvention of Prussian army traditions during the 
reign of Kaiser Wilhelm ii (1889–1918).
in 1977, when the historian Waldemar Röhrbein first suggested the 
need for further research into the perpetuation of Anglo-Hanoverian 
cultural crossovers after the personal union, such an undertaking would 
have represented a Sisyphean and arbitrary task, given the wide dispersal 
of potential sources.16 As a consequence of the digitisation of archive 
catalogues and newspapers, it has now become possible to explore large 
amounts of data for relevant keywords with a speed that would have 
been unthinkable thirty-five years ago. A special debt is owed here to 
The Times online archive and the ever-expanding print-media holdings 
of the British Library that are being made accessible online. Read in 
combination with parliamentary debates, memoirs and secondary 
literature, they promise a richer understanding of the transnational 
legacy of the Napoleonic Wars in Britain and Germany.
i
The military hostilities that broke out between Revolutionary France 
and ancien régime Europe have recently been termed the first total war 
15. Since i use Jan and Aleida Assmann’s two memory categories only in a very broad sense, 
it would go too far to elaborate on their theoretical intricacies and the transformative effect 
that their work has had on memory studies. See J. Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, 
Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen (Munich, 1992); A.  Assmann, 
Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses (Munich, 1999); 
A.  Erll, Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen (Stuttgart, 2005), pp.  27–33, 112–18; 
G. Sebald and J. Weyand, ‘Zur Formierung sozialer Gedächtnisse’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, xv 
(2011), pp. 174–89.
16. W.R. Röhrbein, ‘Zusammenfassung—oder: Was blieb von der Personalunion?’, in id. and 
A. von Rohr, eds., Hannover im Glanz und Schatten des britischen Weltreiches (Hannover, 1977), p. 86.
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because of the unprecedented intensification of warfare after 1792.17 
Although the electorate of Hanover was located geographically outside 
the immediate zone of danger, the perpetual campaigns that followed 
eventually caught up with Britain’s continental dependency. When the 
armies of Napoleon did arrive, the anglophile German principality was 
made to feel the full impact of the First consul’s bid for hegemony 
on the continent. A French invasion under the command of General 
Edouard Mortier in May 1803 secured the disbandment of the entire 
electoral army in the convention of Artlenburg, and set in motion 
the flight of large numbers of disgruntled Hanoverians across the 
channel. The British government supported the exodus materially, 
since it welcomed volunteers for the war effort against Napoleon. The 
30,000 former soldiers, escaped draft-dodgers and prisoners of war who 
passed into the so-called King’s German Legion (KGL) over the next 
twelve years won fame for their military achievements as well as iconic 
status in later narratives of the Napoleonic Wars.18 in 1910, the amateur 
historian Adolf Pfannkuche stressed proudly in a popular history of the 
KGL that the ‘feats of the Legion are what raised us from the ashes of 
an epoch of humiliation’. While he and many of his contemporaries 
looked with regret on Hanover’s ‘fateful’ bondage to British diplomacy, 
he also had nothing but praise for Britain as a ‘paragon of national 
liberty, a solid rock in the sea on which Hanoverians sought and found 
sanctuary’.19
ironically, at the time of the KGL’s inception, opposition politicians 
in Britain painted King George iii’s subjects from the continent as a 
royalist Praetorian Guard with ambitions to overthrow that national 
liberty. in making these accusations, they resuscitated old fears dating 
back to 1742, 1756 and 1775, when Hanoverian troops had last been 
hired. The clash between legionnaires and irish militiamen at Tullamore 
(1806), followed by the participation of Hanoverian troops in the 
flogging of militiamen protesting about the price of knapsacks in the 
cambridgeshire town of Ely in 1809, could not but fan the rhetorical 
17. D.A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It 
(Boston, MA, 2007), esp. p. 9. For stimulating discussions about the applicability of the concept 
to Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare, see also R. chickering and S. Förster, eds., War in an 
Age of Revolution, 1775–1815 (cambridge, 2010).
18. The particulars of recruitment to the KGL have been so thoroughly explored that i will 
refrain from further discussion. For details, see J.  Mastnak, ‘Werbung und Ersatzwesen der 
Königlich Deutschen Legion 1803 bis 1813’, Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift, lx (2001), pp. 119–42; 
D.S. Gray, ‘The Services of the King’s German Legion in the Army of the Duke of Wellington, 
1809–1815’ (Florida State Univ. Ph.D thesis, 1970), pp. 1–77.
19. A. Pfannkuche, Die königl. Deutsche Legion (King’s German Legion) 1803–1816 (Hannover, 
1910), pp. 264–5.
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fire of Radicals such as William cobbett.20 Because of such expressions 
of visceral opposition to the presence of the KGL in Britain, in addition 
to accusations of the preferential treatment that they received at the 
expense of native forces, the more upbeat histories of the unit—such as 
that of Pfannkuche—have attracted censure for being too nostalgic.21
it is argued here, by contrast, that the negative stereotyping of 
Hanoverians ignored the reconciliatory counter-pull of the ‘transnational 
social space’ (to borrow a term coined by Ludger Pries) that the 
legionnaires managed to carve out for themselves in English society. 
This comprised social practices, artefacts and symbols far exceeding 
any previous Anglo-Hanoverian interactions, which is precisely why 
republican Radicals were slow to make acknowledgements that could 
have been construed as retrospective approval for the 1804 Foreign 
Enlistment Act of the Tories.22 in fact, the size of the emigrant legion, 
and the infrastructural investments needed for its accommodation, 
irrevocably changed the character of the local communities that hosted 
the recruits. Bexhill, a town of a mere 1,000 inhabitants in south-east 
England, saw its population expand nearly threefold in August 1804 
with the arrival of four KGL infantry battalions. Although residents 
gave the foreigners a cool reception, the parish of St Peter’s had already 
begun recording the first weddings by the end of the month. Regular 
bi-national social functions, and memorable traits of the Germans 
such as their fine singing and love of horses, did not fail to make an 
impression on the town’s population, and notably its women, no fewer 
than 108 of whom entered into marriage with legionnaires before the 
KGL left Bexhill in August 1814.23
20. N.B. Harding, ‘Hanover and British Republicanism’, in Simms and Riotte, eds., The 
Hanoverian Dimension in British History, p. 322. it appears, however, that the irish militia started 
the altercation at Tullamore. Pro-German voices seized on this redeeming detail to exonerate 
the KGL after the Napoleonic Wars. cf. D.S. Gray, ‘“A Gross Violation of the Publick Peace”: 
The Tullamore incident, 1806’, Irish Sword: Journal of the Military History Society of Ireland, xii 
(1976), pp. 298–301; ‘History of the King’s German Legion’, Athenaeum, cclx (1832), p. 675. On 
the hiring of Hanoverian mercenaries in the eighteenth century, see Simms, Three Victories and 
a Defeat, pp. 595–6, 609.
21. Harding, ‘Hanover and British Republicanism’, p. 320; Morning Chronicle, 17 Nov. 1817, 
‘To the Editor’; Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, p. 256.
22. Many of the KGL’s field officers were familiar with the British army through their 
service in Gibraltar and india in the 1780s and 1790s, but, as chen Tzoref-Ashkenazi has shown 
recently, Hanoverians maintained a cultural separateness from the British colonial establishment. 
The intensifying anglicisation of the Hanoverians after 1803 found outward expression in the 
introduction of English as the language of command: c.  Tzoref-Ashkenazi, ‘Hanoverians, 
Germans, and Europeans: colonial identity in Early British india’, Central European History, 
xliii (2010), pp. 221–38. On Ludger Pries’ definition of transnational space as constituted by social 
practices, see ‘The approach of transnational social spaces: responding to new configurations 
of the social and the spatial’, in L.  Pries, ed., New Transnational Social Spaces: International 
Migration and Transnational Companies in the Early Twenty-First Century (London and New 
York, 2001), p. 18.
23. A. Uffindell and M. corum, On the Fields of Glory: The Battlefields of the 1815 Campaign 
(London, 1996), pp. 328–9.
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The British army on campaign had occasion to deepen these bilateral 
encounters. Hanoverians participated in a range of far-flung missions 
in collaboration with ethnically British units; at Waterloo alone KGL 
regiments were dispersed among three separate army corps, while a 
relatively significant number of officers went on to obtain transfer into 
the British service proper by exchange or promotion.24 Evidence of 
benign ‘otherness’ impressed comrades of the other nationality all the 
more deeply on those occasions when it broke through the emotional 
desensitisation caused by the horrors of war to which armies were 
exposed on campaign. captain cavalié Mercer of the Royal Horse 
Artillery, whose memoirs remain one of the most detailed and lively 
eye-witness accounts of the 1815 campaign, observed: ‘Affection for, and 
care of, his horse, is the trait, par excellence, which distinguishes the 
German dragoon from the English.’ Significantly, the adoption of KGL 
cavalry training manuals served as a call for imitation of Hanoverian 
horsemanship, as did the perpetuation of more anecdotal evidence in 
autobiographies and newspapers.25 At the height of chartist unrest, 
the Tory journal, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, reflected on the 
discipline of the legionnaires in 1838:
[The KGL’s] general character and conduct had no slight influence on the 
British soldiery. The remarkable propriety of conduct exhibited by the 
Germans in general, whether under arms or off duty, their love of music, 
their freedom from riot or intoxication, their scientific knowledge, in a 
great many instances, of the more profound parts of their profession, and 
the striking skill, and even the perfection with which they performed the 
duties of parade and field days, were felt by the British as an example from 
which much was to be learned, and from which, when the first aversion of 
John Bull to all foreigners was got over, the national good sense learned a 
great deal.26
Admiration for certain Hanoverian traits complemented rather than 
contradicted British national pride. The author of the above lines 
supported cultural borrowing as a means to aid Providence in ‘exalting 
England’ above all other powers.
For similar reasons, Britain’s German allies featured more prominently in 
popular commemorations of Waterloo than some modern historians seem 
24. Of a total of 1,350 KGL officers, 44 from the infantry and cavalry entered the British service 
in this way. Presumably this figure would have been higher still had promotion in the British army 
been by merit or seniority rather than purchase, which few Hanoverians could afford. in the KGL, 
advancement took place by the former method. N. Ludlow Beamish, History of the King’s German 
Legion (2 vols., London, 1832–7), ii. 629–31, 669–71.
25. cavalié Mercer, Journal of the Waterloo Campaign Kept throughout the Campaign of 
1815 (1870; London, 1927), p. 42. cf. Chums, 17 Oct. 1894, ‘The Pets of the Regiments’; F. von 
Arentsschildt, Instructions for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of Cavalry on Outpost 
Duty, abr. F. Ponsonby (London, 1844).
26. ‘The King’s German Legion’, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, xliii (1838), pp. 739, 743.
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prepared to admit. ‘Revisionists’ such as David Hamilton-Williams and 
Peter Hofschröer have tried to debunk the myth of a British victory 
by contending that British accounts in general, and Wellington’s 
in particular, deliberately ignored the pivotal input of non-British 
forces.27 The festivities held to mark the thirty-fifth anniversary of the 
battle in the Lancashire town of Preston, on the other hand, indicate 
that the Germans formed part of an inclusive, one may go so far as 
to say grateful, commemorative discourse at the local level. Following 
established custom, the mayor hosted a lavish dinner for veterans of 
the Napoleonic Wars and resident notables in the corn Exchange. 
Unsurprisingly, the toastmasters used the occasion to extol the gallantry 
of the British forces, but, more surprisingly, they also acknowledged the 
relatively small number of Britons present at Waterloo and praised the 
other national contingents. This was done to throw into even greater 
relief Wellington’s outstanding deployment of a multinational coalition 
that comprised raw new levies from Belgium, Brunswick, Hanover, 
Nassau and the Netherlands. The effect was to suggest parallels with 
great generals of the preceding century, such as Eugene of Savoy and 
the duke of Marlborough, whose reputations derived in part from 
their successful management of coalition armies and the fame they had 
won not just nationally but throughout Europe. The glorification of 
Wellington notwithstanding, toasts to the KGL’s ‘gallant’ defence of 
La Haye Sainte and the Prussian army’s ‘great service to the British 
troops’ conveyed an implicit admission that victory had indeed been 
a close-run thing. if Waterloo anniversaries in Preston’s conservative 
circles showed any unique traits, it was in the elaborate way in which 
the prosperous citizens of this industrialising hub of cotton production 
celebrated the day.28 As one contributor to the United Service Magazine 
noted eloquently, ‘[f ]or ages the Germans fought in the cause and 
service of England on many a glorious field, and the gallant legions of 
Hanover, till lately our own, have especially distinguished themselves 
under the British flag. Their reminiscences of victory are the same 
as ours, and their part in them was to the full as honourable and as 
glorious.’29
27. cf. D.H. Williams, Waterloo: New Perspectives. The Great Battle Reappraised (New York, 
1993), p. 11; P. Hofschröer, 1815—The Waterloo Campaign: The German Victory. From Waterloo to 
the Fall of Napoleon (London, 1999), pp. 336–8.
28. The Preston Guardian, 22 June 1850, ‘Anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo’; D. Hunt, 
A History of Preston (Preston, 1992), pp. 193–4, 97–8. Most newspapers tended to provide only 
sparing descriptions of Waterloo anniversaries, but it is notable that in cosmopolitan Manchester, 
too, the municipal Waterloo dinner of 1849 displayed the flags of the Dutch-German allies at 
one end of the banquet hall: Manchester Times, 16 June 1849. For contemporary comparisons of 
Marlborough and Wellington as managers of coalitions, see ‘Marlborough No. ii’, Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine, lviii (1845), p.  658; ‘Eugene, Marlborough, Frederick, Napoleon, and 
Wellington’, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, lxi (1847), pp. 45–6.
29. Colburn’s United Service Magazine, 1855, Part 1, p. 111.
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To be sure, there were variations in the degree to which writers and 
anniversary celebrants acknowledged Britain’s debt to foreign soldiers—
Hanoverians certainly tended to be praised more than Blücher’s Prussians, 
because of their service under Wellington’s command—but the court and 
keen observers of continental politics knew better than to marginalise the 
role that German troops had played in the victory over Napoleon. On the 
contrary, given Britain’s limited military resources on land, excessive self-
adulation posed the risk in their eyes of lulling Britons into a false sense 
of security and alienating former and potential future allies. However 
prejudicial this was to national self-esteem, the high-society newspaper 
The Morning Post nevertheless admonished its readers, just as the Anglo-
Hanoverian personal union was breaking up in June 1837, that the public 
needed to learn the ‘wholesome truth’ about the dependence of the British 
isles on faithful auxiliaries, and consequently the importance of ‘keeping 
up that intimate connection’ with Hanover ‘so long as the frail and 
perishable nature of all human alliances will permit’.30
The Hanoverian authorities had long laid the groundwork for such 
overtures from London by preserving a bilateral space of memory in 
official commemorations of the Napoleonic Wars. The name for the site 
of Napoleon’s final defeat was a telling indicator, as Hanoverians adopted 
the British ‘Waterloo’ rather than the Prussian ‘Belle Alliance’. The 
popularisation of the term ‘Waterloo’ was expressive of a commitment 
to the British viewpoint for political as well as cultural reasons. Whereas 
the Peace column constructed on Belle-Alliance Platz in Berlin in 1840 
reflected the dichotomous contextualisation of the ‘Wars of Liberation’ 
(1813–15) in Prussia by drawing on both monarchical and bourgeois 
allegory, the use of ‘Waterloo’ reflected an unambiguous loyalty to the 
ruling house.31 Financed by voluntary subscription and the Hanoverian 
diet to generate a semblance of popular endorsement, a small group of 
courtiers oversaw the construction of the so-called Waterloo column (1816–
32) in Hannover to pay homage and curry favour with their sovereign.32 
The monument celebrated ‘courage and fidelity to king and fatherland’ 
by semiotically branding the names of all Waterloo casualties with the 
Guelph coat of arms under a statue of Victory. What added a special twist 
to this exercise in monarchical legitimation was the fact that the dual royal 
titles of the dynasty were reflected at the dedication ceremony. Hanoverian 
soldiers visually affirmed the existence of the personal union by wearing 
scarlet tunics reminiscent of British uniforms, and by singing ‘God save 
30. Morning Post, 21 June 1837, p. 6, ‘The Kingdom of Hanover’.
31. U. Bischoff, Denkmäler der Befreiungskriege in Deutschland 1813–1815 (2 vols., Berlin, 
1977), ii. 111–35; M. Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland: Befreiungskriege (6 vols., Heidelberg, 
1985–7), i.  222–4. On Prussian memory, see c.  clark, ‘The Wars of Liberation in Prussian 
Memory: Reflections on the Memorialization of War in Early Nineteenth-century Germany’, 
Journal of Modern History, lxviii (1996), p. 552.
32. Since both the kingdom and the capital shared the same name, spelling is used to distinguish 
them. ‘Hannover’ designates the city.
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the King’. Afterwards the officers attended a dinner in a banquet hall that 
was decorated with the twin portraits of Wellington and the former field 
commander of the KGL, General count carl von Alten.33
Despite its elitist and military overtones, the anglicisation of 
Hanoverian identity also influenced bourgeois mainstream patriotism, 
where it acquired progressive political overtones. At the laying of 
the foundation stone for the national Hermann Monument in 1841, 
the delegation from Hanover affixed a commemorative plaque that 
acknowledged Britain’s protection of persecuted patriots: ‘To the 
King’s German Legion, hero-brethren … who, under Britain’s colours, 
demonstrated German loyalty to their king and preserved the honour 
of his army for the fatherland.’34 Although it was damaging, the way 
in which British public opinion sided with Denmark rather than the 
German confederation in the First Schleswig-Holstein War (1848–
50) left Hanoverian liberals’ faith in the fundamental benevolence of 
British foreign policy and in the commonality of Anglo-Hanoverian 
interests intact. London remained a useful ally against the conservative 
momentum emanating from the rulers of Russia, Prussia and Austria. 
Notables and middle-class entrepreneurs active in the German national 
movement therefore sought to counteract Russophile sympathies in 
their own country by raising donations during the crimean War for 
Britain’s ‘cause of justice and civilization’ against Russia.35
Hanoverian support for British military operations in the crimea 
bore witness also to the intertwined evolution of Hanoverian and British 
memory even after the formal termination of the personal union. The 
British naval officer and travel writer Adolphus Slade, who passed 
through Hannover a couple of years after that event, was struck by 
ample proof of the Hanoverian army being ‘essentially English in tone 
and feeling, and from its noble services under the Duke [of Wellington] 
[it] almost considers itself as still forming part of the British army’.36 
Stressing the historical connection with Albion allowed Hanoverian 
patriots to emphasise their own ancestors’ sacrifices for the liberation 
of Germany from Napoleonic tyranny. They saw the attachment of the 
KGL to Wellington’s forces as doubly liberating, because not only did this 
partnership secure military victory but it also acculturated the legionnaires 
33. Bischoff, Denkmäler der Befreiungskriege, ii. 570–72. See also M. Bresemann, ‘Des Königs 
Deutsche Legion 1803–1816 und ihre Überlieferung in der königlich hannoverschen Armee bis 
1866’, Zeitschrift für Heereskunde, xlix (1985), pp. 102–7.
34. cited in B. Schwertfeger, Peninsula–Waterloo: Zum Gedächtnis der Königlich Deutschen 
Legion (Hannover, 1914), p. 9.
35. See the open letter from the Hanoverian Zeitung für Norddeutschland to the secretary of the 
Royal commission Patriotic Fund, 13 Jan. 1855, reprinted in Colburn’s United Service Magazine, 
1855, Part 1, p. 276. cf. the report from John Duncan Bligh to the earl of clarendon, 23 May 1854, 
reprinted in M. Mösslang, c. Manias and T. Riotte, eds., British Envoys to Germany, 1816–1866 (4 
vols., cambridge, 2000–2010), iv. 230–32.
36. Adolphus Slade, Travels in Germany and Russia: Including a Steam Voyage by the Danube 
and the Euxine from Vienna to Constantinople, in 1838–39 (London, 1840), p. 37.
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to the ‘liberal social customs’ and the ‘grand constitutional state-system’ 
of England, according to the early twentieth-century KGL historian 
Pfannkuche.37 Even allowing for the fact that cultural transfer sometimes 
represented less a voluntary choice than a precondition for Hanoverian 
officers’ survival in polite English society, Pfannkuche’s assessment came 
very close to the image that veterans projected of themselves.38 The son 
and biographer of the KGL artillery commander, General Sir Julius 
(von) Hartmann, reminisced that his father had combined in himself 
‘the self-confidence of a scion of a Hanoverian civil service family and an 
English gentleman’.39 The career of the Jäger officer Schütz von Brandis 
underscored how intergenerational communication similarly moulded 
popular knowledge about the Napoleonic Wars in other families. Born 
into a military dynasty with ties to the KGL in 1826, he left the Hanoverian 
service in 1854 to volunteer for the short-lived British German Legion in 
the crimean War, before returning to his fatherland and taking part in the 
battle of Langensalza, eventually resigning his commission not long after 
the Prussian annexation of Hanover. in retirement, he wrote a history of 
the KGL that described in great detail the gentlemanly code of British 
officers and its centrality to the esprit de corps of their Hanoverian brethren. 
Brandis’ views were representative of a predominantly aristocratic segment 
of society, whose pride in the army was only matched by their ingrained 
mistrust of Prussia.40
For these Anglophiles, playing the English card was above all a 
political and psychological ploy to keep Prussification at bay. Since the 
seventeenth century, Guelphs and Hohenzollerns had led an uneasy 
coexistence, fighting with or against each other as the international 
political situation demanded. Hanoverian ‘particularists’ never quite 
forgave Prussia for the temporary annexation of the then electorate 
in 1805 and hoped, instinctively, that the old ally Britain would again 
protect or at any rate not betray them in a political crisis.41 On the 
37. Pfannkuche, Die königl. deutsche Legion, p. 265.
38. Friedrich von der Decken, one of the founding fathers of the KGL, complained that upper-
class Germans in London quickly had to adopt English dress and social conventions to offset ‘the 
lack of patience for things foreign among Britons’: Friedrich von der Decken, Versuch über den 
englischen National-Charackter (2nd edn., Hannover, 1817), p. 276.
39. Julius von Hartmann, Der Königlich Hannoversche General Sir Julius von Hartmann: Eine 
Lebensskizze (Hannover, 1858), p. 188. Hartmann was not the only senior Hanoverian officer to be 
characterised in this way. carl von Alten’s biographer Julius Runnebaum similarly described the 
KGL field commander as the ideal of an ‘Anglo-Hanoverian gentleman’: J. Runnebaum, General 
Graf Carl von Alten: Ein Soldat Europas (Hildesheim, 1964), p. 122.
40. Schütz von Brandis, Übersicht der Geschichte der Hannoverschen Armee von 1617–1866, ed. 
J. von Reitzenstein (Hannover and Leipzig, 1903). Biographical details of the author are contained 
in the preface.
41. G. Bartels, Preußen im Urteil Hannovers 1815–1851 (Hildesheim, 1960), pp.  109–11; 
D. Brosius, ‘Hannover und Preußen vor 1866’, in R. Sabelleck, ed., Hannovers Übergang vom 
Königreich zur preußischen Provinz (Hannover, 1995), pp.  23–30; F. Köster, Hannover und die 
Grundlegung der preußischen Suprematie in Deutschland 1862–1864 (Hildesheim, 1978). On the 
Prussian reasons for the annexation in 1805, see B. Simms, The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High 
Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797–1806 (cambridge, 1997), pp. 280–85.
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fiftieth anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, amid the portents of an 
imminent Prusso-Austrian showdown in Germany, an anonymous 
pamphleteer reminded his readers: ‘The shared royal house nurtured a 
feeling of kinship, which is still felt notably in [the duchy of ] Bremen, 
where maritime trade has kept [this notion] alive among the people. 
Even now the populace would not be able to believe that the English … 
would ever side against us in a general war.’42 When conflict did break 
out one year later, the prediction about Britain’s good intentions proved 
to be accurate, although there was little Whitehall could do to prevent 
the dethronement of Queen Victoria’s hapless cousin, King Georg V, 
at the hands of Otto von Bismarck. Nevertheless it is testament to 
the endurance of the ideals embodied by the KGL that Hanoverian 
émigrés opted to form the first of two exile legions for the liberation of 
the fatherland in London, and that the daughter of the KGL’s former 
colonel-in-chief, the duke of cambridge, secretly agreed to help them 
find work in the United Kingdom.43 The particularist politician and 
grandson of a KGL general, Heinrich Langwerth von Simmern, lent 
his influential voice to the recruitment drive by imploring fellow 
Hanoverians not to deny their innate British ‘life essence’ at a time 
when the fatherland was in danger.44
ii
The self-perpetuating references to the past in Anglo-Hanoverian 
relations that were made into the 1860s touch on an important but 
under-appreciated facet of post-Napoleonic collective memory. Several 
historians have contended that the strategies that European societies 
adopted in response to the human cost of war consisted of abstraction 
and anonymisation. They point to the phenomenon that few fallen 
soldiers, except officers, were given individual grave-markers, which 
reduced the nineteenth-century mourning process to one of ‘complete 
individual dissolution’.45 The Achilles heel of this interpretation is not 
so much that it fails to account for instances of individual mourning, 
such as the listing of battle casualties on the Waterloo column, but 
42. ‘Ein Bremenser’, Die Teilnahme der Herzogthümer Bremen und Verden an der deutschen 
Erhebung gegen die Franzosenherrschaft und namentlich an der Schlacht von Waterloo: Eine 
Festschrift zur Feier des 18. Juni (Hannover, 1865), p. 4.
43. J. Heinzen, ‘The Guelph “conspiracy”: Hanover as Would-Be intermediary in the 
European System, 1866–1870’, International History Review, xxix (2007), p. 265.
44. [Heinrich Langwerth von Simmern], Der Hannöverische Particularismus: Eine oratio pro 
domo (Mannheim, 1867), pp. 9–14.
45. T.W. Laqueur, ‘Memory and Naming in the Great War’, in J.R. Gillis, ed., Commemorations: 
The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, NJ, 1994), p. 151. cf. G.L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: 
Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (Oxford, 1990), pp.  45–7; D.W. Lloyd, Battlefield 
Tourism: Pilgrimages and the Commemoration of the Great War in Britain, Australia and Canada, 
1919–1939 (Oxford, 1998), p. 21.
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rather that the evidence is restricted to war memorials. Other popular 
mechanisms for coming to terms with the death or maiming of soldiers, 
and especially a mnemonic dialogue founded on charity between the 
former allies, are thereby sidelined. The next section will explore that 
part of the bilateral social space in which Britons and Hanoverians 
remembered the trials of war together.
Philanthropy, as Eliza Renee Milkes has demonstrated in a study 
of the voluntary subscriptions to the Waterloo Fund after 1815, 
was central to the commemoration in Britain of the victory over 
Napoleon. The subscription sermons delivered by sympathetic clergy 
reminded readers of the suffering amid the triumph, and encouraged 
non-combatants to redeem their feelings of guilt for having escaped death 
through donations. The Waterloo Fund dispensed the funds collected 
in this manner among disabled veterans and the poor widows of fallen 
soldiers to whom state pensions were not available.46 Philanthropists’ 
consideration for the plight of women mirrored the success of wartime 
writers such as Anne Hunter, isabella Lickbarrow, Mary Leadbeater 
and Amelia Opie in promoting a distinctly female perspective on the 
misery inflicted upon soldiers’ families. Destitute war widows appealed 
to Georgian sensibilities doubly, because their vulnerability to material 
poverty and gendered sensitivity were considered to make the loss of 
loved ones all the harder for them to bear.47 King George iii instructed 
the Treasury to make no distinction between the widows of British and 
foreign officers in the disbursement of pensions. The press followed the 
example of the government by investing the financial and emotional 
vulnerabilities of Hanoverian women with the aura of the familiar.48 
Taking their cue from metropolitan news outlets, provincial broadsides 
such as the Newcastle Courant and Trewman’s Exeter Flying Post 
reported in late 1828 the story of a KGL officer’s widow and her three 
young children who had been compelled by poverty to apply for parish 
relief from the authorities of St George’s in London. The circumstances 
of the ‘unhappy lady’ were not newsworthy for their exoticism but 
rather because they amounted to another ‘of those painful instances 
of destitution that present themselves so frequently of late’.49 The 
German widows of other deceased officers were particularly inclined 
to play on these sentiments when applying to the Waterloo committee 
46. E.R. Milkes, ‘A Battle’s Legacy: Waterloo in Nineteenth-century Britain’ (Yale Univ. Ph.D 
thesis, 2002), p. 203.
47. S.c. Behrendt, ‘“A Few Harmless Numbers”: British Women Poets and the climate of War, 
1793–1815’, in P. Shaw, ed., Romantic Wars: Studies in Culture and Conflict, 1793–1822 (Aldershot, 
2000), p. 14. c. Kennedy, ‘From the Ballroom to the Battlefield: British Women and Waterloo’, 
in A. Forrest, K. Hagemann and J. Rendall, eds., Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences 
and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820 (Basingstoke, 2009), p. 145.
48. British Library, Peel Papers, Additional MS 40414, fos. 336–7, War Office memorandum 
concerning grant of pensions, 17 Feb. 1835.
49. The Newcastle Courant, 27 Dec. 1828, ‘Reverse of Fortune’. See also the reprint of the same 
article in Trewman’s Exeter Flying Post or Plymouth and Cornish Advertiser, 15 Jan. 1829.
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for relief—as late as 1838/9, when the Waterloo Fund reverted to 
the Treasury, two of the three highest-paid annuitants resided in the 
kingdom of Hanover.50
charity, however, did even more to bring British generosity to the 
notice of the Hanoverian lower classes. in the autumn of 1815 the 
managers of the Waterloo Fund contributed £45,000 in the ‘Name 
of the People of the British Empire’ to subscriptions raised for the 
wounded troops of Brunswick, Hanover, Prussia and the Netherlands 
in their own countries. This donation supplemented £62,500 sent to 
the continent by the Westminster Waterloo Association some months 
earlier. With their munificence towards Germany, the royal princes and 
titled aristocrats in the Westminster Waterloo Association consciously 
recognised the ties of the royal family to that country.51 The size of 
the combined donations greatly exceeded what civic initiatives for 
destitute veterans in war-damaged Hanover could muster. By way of 
comparison, the King’s German Legion Relief Fund, which officers set 
up in 1819 for the benefit of their comrades from the ranks, paid out 
just £10,500 until 1836, and by 1854 funds were running so low that 
the Hanoverian state parliament, the Ständeversammlung, had to step 
in.52 The government scarcely performed better. According to Gerhard 
Schneider, the top priority of the newly restored Guelph administration 
in Hanover was economic reconstruction rather than the provision 
of individual relief for needy veterans and their dependants. in this 
way, the blind spots of the social infrastructure in Hanover and the 
eagerness of British philanthropists to alleviate war-induced poverty 
came to complement each other harmoniously—so much so that 
Hanoverian officials received instructions in 1823 to stop prospective 
supplicants from embarking for London.53 The crown transferred fiscal 
responsibility for most invalided veterans to the Hanoverian military 
treasury in 1837, but Whitehall’s continued disbursement of half-pay to 
KGL officers and pensions to the disabled survivors of late eighteenth-
century campaigns remained one of the more idiosyncratic legacies of 
the personal union.54
The unilinear flow of these philanthropic transactions begs the 
larger question as to how far the Napoleonic Wars reinforced a British 
sense of sociocultural superiority over the continent. Undoubtedly, 
one important motivation for thinking about conditions in Hanover 
was pity for those not lucky enough to have been born Englishmen. 
Even writers as favourably disposed to Hanoverians as the Blackwood’s 
50. Milkes, ‘A Battle’s Legacy’, p. 196.
51. ibid., p. 185; Morning Post, 18 June 1818, p. 2, ‘Waterloo Subscription’.
52. N. Ludlow Beamish, Geschichte der Königlich Deutschen Legion (2 vols., Hannover, 1837), 
ii. 526; c. Haase, Das Hannoversche Militair-Pensionswesen (Hannover, 1854), p. 86.
53. G. Schneider, ‘…nicht umsonst gefallen’? Kriegerdenkmäler und Kriegstotenkult in 
Hannover (Hannover, 1991), pp. 33–5.
54. Haase, Das Hannoversche Militair-Pensionswesen, p. 103.
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contributor cited earlier felt, ultimately, that ‘while the humblest 
colony of England was gaining yearly in opulence, population and 
power, Hanover continued in the same degree of moral sterility to 
which it has been so largely condemned by nature’.55 General Friedrich 
von der Decken, one of the early recruiters for the KGL, countered 
from the vantage point of an outsider looking in on British society: 
‘National pride is a mighty engine that drives the actions of Britons; 
no nation ever possessed a more intense feeling of self-worth than 
these islanders.’56 On the other hand, refugees from the continent 
would not have won the kind of acceptance that they did without the 
benefit of countervailing forces acting against supremacist thinking in 
British society. Refuting Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism, David 
cannadine has recently resurrected an idea first developed in the 
writings of Joseph Schumpeter by claiming that the core paradigm of 
British national ideology during the phase of colonial expansion in the 
nineteenth century was not ethnic difference but ‘class’. Read in this way, 
the interactions of Britons with other societies involved the negotiation 
of status similarities and the deliberate cultivation of affinities with 
élites in the extra-metropolitan world, as opposed to the insistence on 
collective dissimilarities.57 Although cannadine’s attempt to establish 
the primacy of horizontal dialogue across social hierarchies has been 
criticised for underestimating the continuing impact of race in modern 
British society (and other conflictual relations of identity), a class-based 
approach nonetheless goes a long way towards conceptualising Anglo-
Hanoverian cultural exchange.58 if anything, racial affinities based on 
the belief in a common Saxon heritage enhanced Hanoverian officers’ 
acceptance in Britain, as long as the latter observed similar standards 
of professionalism and social etiquette, and the Protestant articles of 
faith.59
The opportunities provided by this perceived similarity were 
demonstrated by the steady advancement of the abler aristocratic 
émigrés, including carl von Alten, his brother Victor, Sir Wilhelm von 
Dörnberg and others, to senior binational commands in the Peninsular 
War and at Waterloo. For these senior officers and their descendants, 
acceptance by British peers represented a source of great satisfaction. 
Anglo-Saxon comrades ‘quickly and readily recognised the efficiency 
and capability of the immigrated [Hanoverians]’, the great-nephew of 
55. ‘The King’s German Legion’, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, pp. 740–41.
56. Decken, Versuch über den englischen National-Charackter, p. 127.
57. D. cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Oxford, 2001), p. 8. 
On the importance of class in British imperialist ideology, see also B. Porter, The Absent-Minded 
Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford, 2004).
58. See reviews of cannadine, Ornamentalism, by A. Burton, American Historical Review, cvii 
(2002), pp. 497–8, and i.c. Fletcher, Victorian Studies, xlv (2003), pp. 532–4.
59. On English ‘Teutomania’, see P. Mandler, The English National Character: The History of 
an Idea from Edmund Burke to Tony Blair (New Haven and London, 2006), pp. 86–105.
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the KGL colonel christian von Ompteda proudly observed, ‘and looked 
on their officers as “gentlemen”’.60 General von Hartmann, who visited 
London in 1838 for Queen Victoria’s coronation, likewise appreciated 
the warm welcome which he and his compatriots received from former 
comrades, the duke of Wellington and other ‘important men’. He 
took this as confirmation that ‘we Hanoverians, but particularly we 
legionnaires, are held in high regard by this great nation’.61 The annual 
Waterloo banquets at Wellington’s London residence, Apsley House, 
afforded irregularly attending Hanoverian officers the opportunity to 
reciprocate by assuring the ageing duke that the ‘old men’ of their army 
made it a point to celebrate his birthday.62 They also joined representatives 
from other armies that had fought with or under Wellington to take a 
leading part in the funeral procession of their former commander in 
1852, as ceremonial bearers of his Hanoverian field marshal’s baton. in 
so doing, the mourners reactivated transnational connections born out 
of a sense of shared military achievement and a powerful language of 
mutual understanding between Allied Waterloo veterans.63 Although 
their ranks were thinning by mid-century, the clout of the surviving 
officers increased in inverse proportion as they moved into leadership 
positions. Only the retirement of Hanover’s last minister of war in 1866 
brought the reign of these Anglo-Hanoverian veterans, and with it their 
social networks, to an end.64
class solidarity and military comradeship extended in two directions. 
The cultivation of Anglo-Hanoverian affinities enabled officers to 
recognise each other’s achievements in the Napoleonic Wars, and at the 
same time fashioned a joint platform for interaction with the public at 
large in efforts to honour the dead. The sacralisation of the Waterloo 
battlefield is a case in point. The central shrine to fallen Britons, Waterloo 
church, was discreetly supranational in that it concomitantly housed 
commemorative plaques to the Hanoverian officers (and even rankers) 
who had died under Wellington’s command.65 The farmhouse of La 
Haye Sainte, ‘so gallantly defended’ by the KGL, conjured analogous 
associations for British battlefield visitors, as did the Hanoverian 
Monument erected by KGL officers for their deceased brothers-in-arms 
60. christian F. von Ompteda, A Hanoverian-English Officer a Hundred Years Ago, ed. L. von 
Ompteda, tr. J. Hill (London, 1892), p. 173.
61. Hartmann, Der Königlich Hannoversche General Sir Julius von Hartmann, pp. 196–7. See 
also Runnebaum, General Graf Carl von Alten, p. 129.
62. The Times, 19 June 1851, p. 5, ‘The Waterloo Banquet’.
63. The French newspaper La Presse had noticed the transnational habitus of Waterloo veterans 
a few years earlier. See the issue of 22 June 1845, p. 2. For a detailed description of the occasion, 
see The Lancaster Gazette and General Advertiser for Lancashire, Westmoreland and Yorkshire, 20 
Nov. 1852, p. 5, ‘The Duke of Wellington’s Funeral’.
64. For lists of high-ranking officers alive in the 1850s and 1860s, see The Times, ‘The Waterloo 
Banquet’, and Die Königlich Deutsche Legion und das Hannoversche Corps bei Waterloo: Ein 
Erinnerungskranz für das Land Hannover zum 18. Juni 1865 (Hannover, 1865), pp. 40–41.
65. Milkes, ‘A Battle’s Legacy’, pp. 350–51.
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in 1818. When two English gentlemen discovered the memorial in a 
state of neglect in the early 1840s, they went to considerable lengths to 
apprise the appropriate authorities of the situation. ‘i trust’, charles 
White, a former aide to the duke of cambridge, explained to the 
adjutant general of King Ernst August, ‘that my motives for troubling 
you will not be attributed to any other feeling than to the regret 
i should suffer at the record of so much valour being allowed to fall into 
decay for the want of a few timely repairs—and to my deep interest and 
veneration for all matters connected with a country where i met with so 
much kindness and hospitality.’66 The king did not doubt White’s good 
intentions and promptly attended to the repairs.
Anglo-Hanoverian collaboration in the preservation of battlefield 
monuments was emblematic of wider efforts by survivors of the 
Napoleonic campaigns to assert entitlements to public recognition. 
Partnership promised palpable benefits that unilateral action did not, 
the most important of these being mutual validation. Veterans and 
their historians could not easily praise the martial prowess of their own 
side without appearing immodest or biased, but foreign endorsement 
was a different matter altogether. The German translator of N. Ludlow 
Beamish’s History of the King’s German Legion (1832–7; translated in 
1837)  admitted as much in his foreword when he explained that the 
initiative of an Englishman had been needed to undertake such a book 
project because of the ‘exaggerated modesty’ of his countrymen.67 in 
acknowledgement of his services, surviving KGL officers presented 
Beamish with an appropriate gift, a finely crafted silver table 
centrepiece worth no less than £900.68 conversely, the attachment of 
the Hanoverians to Wellington’s command in the Peninsula and at 
Waterloo made these foreigners a valuable source of information for 
British military chroniclers; captain William Siborne, the infamous 
model-maker and author of the groundbreaking History of the War 
in France and Belgium in 1815 (1848), drew extensively on eyewitness 
accounts from KGL officers.69 The affiliation of the legionnaires with 
the British army furthermore ensured that respected soldiers were ready 
to speak up for Wellington when he faced criticism in Germany. His 
‘intimate friendship’ with General von Hartmann, for instance, helped 
to calm the waves after some notoriously impolitic remarks about 
66. Hannover, N[iedersächsisches] H[aupt-]St[aats-]A[rchiv], Hann. 41, xxi, Nr. 158, charles 
White to General Ernst von Linsingen, 27 Aug. 1840. See also the letter by Edmund Henry 
Plunkett in the same folder. Tellingly, too, the enterprising artist Louise B[onaist] catered to the 
tastes of British tourists on the battlefield after 1815 by painting souvenir ceramics with scenes of 
Waterloo church as well as the Hanoverian Monument: Milkes, ‘A Battle’s Legacy’, p. 378.
67. Translator’s foreword, in Beamish, Geschichte der Königlich Deutschen Legion, vol. i, 
pp. xiv–xv.
68. ‘The King’s German Legion’, Colburn’s United Service Magazine, 1852, Part 1, p. 393. The 
trophy can now be seen at the National Army Museum in London (NAM.2004-08-1-1).
69. P. Hofschröer, Wellington’s Smallest Victory: The Duke, the Model Maker and the Secret of 
Waterloo (London, 2004), pp. 118–19.
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Prussian discipline at Waterloo in 1836.70 Likewise, Hartmann played 
his part in defending the conduct of the British forces against outside 
criticism by rebutting claims put forth in the works of the French 
military historian General Maximilien Foy, author of Histoire de la 
guerre de la péninsule sous Napoléon (1827).71
Still, there was one issue on which Wellington and even the most 
loyal Peninsular veterans parted company; but this, too, served to keep 
the transnational comradeship of the old soldiers alive. For years the 
participants in the campaigns in Portugal and Spain lobbied unsuccessfully 
for a token of official recognition on a par with the Waterloo Medal (1816). 
in spite of his pre-eminent role in the Peninsular War, the duke blocked 
these advances because he considered the thanks of Parliament to have 
been sufficient, and Waterloo ‘an occurrence of an extraordinary nature’.72 
Raising the profile of the iberian theatre of war sat awkwardly with his 
personal ambition to elevate Waterloo above all other victories, and so 
himself above other victors. Many veterans had missed out on this final 
battle by being stationed elsewhere and were galled to receive no outward 
mark of their achievements and long service. Tensions between Waterloo 
and Peninsular regiments consequently led to more than one serious riot.73
The termination of the Anglo-Hanoverian union had the unforeseen 
benefit of clearing the way for Hanoverian recognition of the KGL’s 
Peninsular war record. On 11 May 1841 King Ernst August issued a 
campaign medal (Kriegsdenkmünze) as a ‘testimonial of the high and 
well-merited favour’ in which the veterans were held, and recipients 
still on active duty had the initials KDM marked against their name on 
army lists.74 contrary to all expectations, the king’s gesture rekindled 
the friendship between the Hanoverian veterans and their frustrated 
British counterparts. Shortly after the promulgation of the decree, 
Major christoph Heise of the Gardejäger—the same man who had 
egged on Beamish to write the History of the King’s German Legion75—
contacted the editor of the United Service Journal to emphasise that
70. Hartmann, Der Königlich Hannoversche General Sir Julius von Hartmann, p.  184; John 
Bull and Britannia, 14 June 1856, p. 384, ‘Death of a Peninsular Veteran’. The scandal occurred 
when the Prussian military establishment took offence at comments made by Wellington during 
parliamentary hearings on the abolition of corporal punishment in the British army. See ‘Die 
Aussagen des Herzogs von Wellington über die Disciplin der preußischen Armee’, Militair-
Wochenblatt, xxi (1836), pp. 97–102.
71. Hartmann, Der Königlich Hannoversche General Sir Julius von Hartmann, p.  184. cf. 
Hartmann’s ‘Berichtigung einiger Ansichten über die Verhältnisse der englischen Armee’, 
Hannoversches Militairisches Journal, ii (1832), pp. 88–113.
72. L. Smurthwaite, ‘Glory is Priceless! Awards to the British Army during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars’, in A.J. Guy, ed., The Road to Waterloo: The British Army 
and the Struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 1793–1815 (London, 1990), p. 177. 
H. Strachan, The Reform of the British Army, 1830–54 (Manchester, 1984), pp. 18–19.
73. S.H. Myerly, British Military Spectacle: From the Napoleonic Wars through the Crimea 
(cambridge, MA, 1996), p. 93.
74. ‘Affairs at Home and Abroad’, Colburn’s United Service Journal, 1841, Part 2, pp. 406–7.
75. Beamish, preface, Geschichte der Königlich Deutschen Legion, vol. i, p. ix.
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[i]t would have afforded us [legionnaires] infinite delight, if we had been 
able, long since, to congratulate our brave comrades of the British service 
on a similar testimony of Royal favour, in appreciation of services, which 
in our case have now been so graciously rewarded by our Sovereign, and 
which we trust, will ere long be awarded to our old companions-in-arms, 
no less deserving of the honourable motto – Tapfer und Treu [courageous 
and Faithful]!76
The United Service Journal, for its part, was quick to praise Ernst 
August’s ‘act of justice and grace’, and joined the plea for Queen Victoria 
to emulate his example. Although the creation of the Hanoverian 
Peninsular Medal failed to sway Horse Guards and Parliament in the 
short term, it undoubtedly sped up royal authorisation of the Military 
General Service Medal in 1847, which vindicated Hanoverian and 
British veterans alike since the General Order imposed no restriction 
on binational eligibility. More than 1,300 Hanoverian veterans went 
on to apply for the Military General Service Medal.77 The two 
respective Peninsular awards in this way paid conspicuous tribute to 
the collaborative spirit of British and Hanoverian discourses about 
military valour far into the mid-nineteenth century.78 The way in which 
the veterans chose to share valour rather than to divide up martial 
achievement along strictly national lines had a knock-on effect on the 
British public sphere, where bourgeois entertainment media such as 
Slade’s travelogues and Robert Burford’s popular Waterloo panoramas 
in Leicester Square, London, accorded Hanoverians a prominent 
place in Wellington’s victories.79 No such reminders were needed in 
Hanover, since the veterans of the King’s German Legion considered 
themselves to be a living monument to British military traditions on 
the continent, earning them the nickname ‘the Englishmen’ among 
their half-admiring, half-jealous countrymen for their feats against 
Napoleon in Spain and Sicily.80
76. ‘Affairs at Home and Abroad’, p. 406.
77. Smurthwaite, ‘Glory is Priceless!’, p.  172. For further details on the applicants, see also 
NHStA, Hann. 38D, Nr. 1241.
78. it similarly says a great deal about the extent of the overlapping conceptions of valour that 
Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, chancellor of the Order of St Michael and St George in 1840, chose 
to include the Hanoverian Order of the Guelphs in his four-volume compendium of British 
knighthood orders, on account of its conferral on so ‘many hundreds of British Subjects’: Nicholas 
Harris Nicolas, History of the Orders of Knighthood (4 vols., London, 1842), vol. i, pp. l–li.
79. Robert Burford and H.A. Barker, Description of a View of the Battle of Waterloo: With the 
Disposition of the Troops Engaged in the Action, Fought on the 18th of June 1815. Now Exhibiting 
at the Panorama, Leicester Square (London, 1842). See also the review of a second panorama by 
Burford in Colburn’s United Service Magazine, 1852, Part 3, p. 582; Slade, Travels in Germany and 
Russia, pp. 37–41.
80. Hartmann, Der Königlich Hannoversche General Julius von Hartmann, pp.  156–7, 161, 
174. See also id., Lebenserinnerungen: Briefe und Aufsätze des Generals der Cavallerie Julius von 
Hartmann (Berlin, 1882), pp. 12–19.
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iii
The prolonged struggle of Peninsular veterans for recognition illustrates 
how politics subtly, yet decisively, set the parameters of public debate 
about the Napoleonic Wars. The further Britain and Hanover moved 
away in time from the personal union, the more ideological points of 
reference and the significance attached to particular events were bound 
to shift. To draw out some of these developments in cultural memory, the 
last part of this article will examine the transition of Anglo-Hanoverian 
military comradeship from a transnational social space to the 
(attempted) construction of ‘invented traditions’. Eric Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger wrote that invented traditions are sociological responses 
to ‘novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, 
or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition’.81 in 
practice, of course, the cultural engineers of fabricated customs in the 
nineteenth century often operated within time-honoured conventions 
already calibrated to regulate and solve recurring problems. The tragic 
story of the so-called British German Legion during the crimean War 
exemplifies the intersection of genuine historical continuity, adaptive 
invention and partisan politics that would turn the Hanoverian 
legionnaires from an asset into a liability for Anglo-German relations in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.
 in 1854, suspicion of Russian autocracy and a resurgent sense of 
Britain’s global greatness led the Peelite-Liberal administration of the 
Earl of Aberdeen to engage in the first major war between the European 
powers since 1815, an event for which the country was woefully 
unprepared. it soon became apparent that no fewer than 90,000 new 
recruits were needed to augment the army’s peacetime establishment of 
100,000 men.82 The recruitment crisis was disconcerting, but cabinet 
and Parliament could relate to it historically by applying the perceived 
lessons of eighteenth-century manpower shortages and, most recently, 
the French Wars. The notion of historia magistra vitae still loomed large 
because the army’s basic method of recruitment—voluntary enlistment 
and the hiring of foreign troops—had not changed much in the previous 
hundred years. Economic boom conditions and employers’ fear of 
adverse effects on the availability of labour hampered recruitment in 
Britain, and therefore forced the government to give more thought to 
the time-honoured remedy of foreign enlistment. Aberdeen’s ministry 
initially hesitated to put legislation to that effect before Parliament, 
lest the recruitment of mercenaries from the continent arouse long-
standing suspicions about reactionary designs to overthrow liberty in 
81. E. Hobsbawm and T.  Ranger, ‘introduction: inventing Traditions’, in eid., eds., The 
Invention of Tradition (cambridge, 1983), p. 2.
82. Strachan, Reform of the British Army, p. 56.
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Britain. Although the Prime Minister’s predictions were not far off 
the mark, the recent disintegration of the Tories and the subsequent 
collapse of the old party system caused the Foreign Enlistment Bill to 
be received in a political climate that deviated sharply from previous 
debates. in the House of Lords, where the Secretary for War, the duke 
of Newcastle, introduced the bill first to test the waters, the most 
heated exchanges took place between Peelites and conservatives, whose 
political pedigrees stretched back on both sides to the Tory foreign 
enlistment statutes of 1794, 1804 and 1806.
The one, albeit contested, constant in the discussion about the 
viability of hiring aliens was the precedent set by the KGL. Newcastle, 
a Peelite, envisaged the initial force of 15,000 men as simply reprising 
the role of the illustrious Hanoverians. The chief interlocutor for 
the conservatives, the earl of Ellenborough, retorted in an overtly 
Whiggish, almost Radical, manner that the employment of foreigners, 
who could be called out to suppress riots, was contrary to all 
constitutional principles. He stressed, moreover, Newcastle’s faulty 
historical reasoning, since the Hanoverians of 1803 had been allies in a 
joint cause, unlike the despised Hessians of the eighteenth century—
who the mercenaries required for the crimean campaign resembled 
more closely. To sink the enlistment bill once and for all, Ellenborough 
appealed to British patriotism by dismissing the inferior discipline of 
foreign, notably German, soldiers. instead of rising to the bait, the duke 
of Richmond, a former Ultra-Tory who had broken ranks over catholic 
Emancipation, immediately went to the defence of the KGL’s record, 
since he thought it an ‘act of justice’ to remember that ‘on no occasion 
was that Legion second to the British army either in zeal or gallantry’.83 
And Richmond did not remain the only commentator to take issue 
with Ellenborough’s assertion. Enraged, Beamish immediately fired off 
letters to the editors of both the left-leaning Morning Chronicle and 
the United Service Magazine with contrary testimonies from eminent 
British generals.84 John Duncan Bligh, the British envoy to Hanover, 
meanwhile appeased hurt Hanoverian pride by blaming the course of 
debates in Parliament on politicians’ ‘overweening vanity’ in the pursuit 
of victory for their party.85
The leader of the conservatives, the earl of Derby, quickly sensed 
that his associate had overplayed the party’s hand and changed tack. He 
conceded in the Lords that the Hanoverians had performed with equal 
distinction to the other members of the British army, but only because 
they were ‘almost countrymen’ anyway. To salvage Ellenborough’s 
83. 3Hans cxxxvi (14 Dec. 1854), 257–63.
84. Morning Chronicle, 26 Dec. 1854, ‘To the Editor’; Morning Chronicle, 28 Dec. 1854, ‘To the 
Editor’; ‘The King’s German Legion’, Colburn’s United Service Magazine, 1855, Part 1, pp. 246–50.
85. John Duncan Bligh to the earl of clarendon, 30 Dec. 1854, cited in Mösslang, Manias and 
Riotte, British Envoys to Germany, iv. 232.
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critique concerning the dissimilarity of the KGL and the proposed 
foreign legion, he continued that the Hanoverian legionnaires had 
been no foreigners at all as ‘subjects of the Sovereign of this country, 
whose battles they were fighting’.86 in pursuing this line of argument, 
Derby replaced Newcastle’s invented tradition with one of his own. 
The Act of Succession of 1700 and a complementary act passed at the 
accession of George i made a clear distinction between the subjects of 
the crown in the British isles and those on the continent. True, Derby 
would have been unable to claim this kinship had there not already 
been uncertainty about the standing of Hanoverians in British law, but 
with his bold interpretation he pre-empted, perhaps even prefigured, a 
Home Office ruling of 1909, some sixty years later, that Hanoverians 
had enjoyed the privileges of natural-born British subjects until the 
separation of the two crowns.87
Given a choice between two doubtful historical precedents, the 
Lords came down on the side of the incumbent government. Following 
a three-day debate in the commons in which the Hanoverian 
legionnaires were barely mentioned, save for Sir Edward Bulwer 
Lytton’s reminder of the widespread hostility to the formation of the 
KGL, the bill passed into law. The 1854 Foreign Enlistment Act deviated 
appreciably from its 1804 predecessor in so far as it prohibited the 
employment of the enlistees for policing duties in the United Kingdom 
and precluded officers’ entitlement to half-pay when their period of 
active service expired.88 The financial provisions of the act were pitched 
too low to attract the most seasoned soldiers and therefore reduced 
from the start the likelihood that the new mercenary corps would 
ever emulate, as Queen Victoria hoped, ‘the reputation of the King’s 
German Legion, so long and so honourably associated with the British 
army in its most memorable campaigns’.89 Thus the newly minted 
German, Swiss and italian Legions failed to follow in the footsteps of 
their Hanoverian predecessors. They arrived too late in the crimea 
to take part in the fighting and re-embarked for Britain disgruntled. 
One italian contingent mutinied en route home and could only be 
persuaded at the last minute not to foment rebellion on the calabrian 
coast against King Ferdinand ii of Naples. Jägers of the German Legion 
clashed with British troops in an affray at Aldershot that left several 
dead. Soon thereafter, the italians and Swiss disbanded under a cloud 
86. 3Hans cxxxvi (14 Dec. 1854), 263–6.
87. T[he] N[ational] A[rchives], P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], HO 45/10399/179658, 
Superintendent of the Home Office registry to customs and Excise, 28 May 1909. See also 
A. Fahrmeir, Citizens and Aliens: Foreigners and the Law in Britain and the German States, 1789–
1870 (New York, 2000), pp. 44–5.
88. c.c. Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimea: The German, Swiss, and Italian Legions in British 
Service, 1854–1856 (Montreal and London, 1977), pp. 51–5.
89. The York Herald, 18 Aug. 1855, ‘The Queen’s Visit to the Foreign Legion’; The Morning 
Post, 19 May 1855.
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of controversy, but the Germans were permitted to stay on as military 
settlers in South Africa, only to cause further problems for the colonial 
administration there.90
The upshot of the Foreign Enlistment Act was the British government’s 
decision never again to raise a European mercenary corps, because the 
extirpation of the ‘legionary plagues’ came at too high a price.91 in the 
sphere of cultural production the exotic appeal of the KGL retained a 
niche in the popular imagination, which military historians, Thomas 
Hardy, and intermittent proposals for the resuscitation of foreign 
legions drew upon. in 1900, the Scottish novelist Sir Herbert Maxwell 
still thought it necessary to counter the not uncommon predilection 
among British military chroniclers to count the Hanoverian troops at 
Waterloo as British with the injunction to recognise the entitlement 
of the Hanoverians, ‘as Germans, to their share of honour in the result 
which they contributed so greatly to bring about’. in political terms, 
though, the crimean fiasco damaged the reputation of the KGL 
beyond repair and so prompted a progressive devaluation in public 
appreciation of its achievements.92
in Hanover, the joint military heritage of the Napoleonic Wars 
seemed headed for a similar fate barely a decade later. The disbandment 
of the Guelph army in 1866, and with it the customs of the KGL, 
sent an unmistakeable signal that becoming Prussian demanded 
cultural assimilation into a ‘community of forgetting’.93 The lack of 
commonalities with Prussian military culture and its particularism made 
the Legion unattractive for commemoration, whereas ‘Waterloo’ fared 
somewhat better because of Prussian involvement in the battle and the 
consequent refashioning of the monarchical-transnational anniversary 
into a symbol of liberal nationalism.94 But, as Benedict Anderson 
has shown, the problem with complex ‘imagined communities’ such 
as nations is that enforced amnesia cannot be complete; suppressed 
90. Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimea, pp. 118–33. As a historical footnote, it is interesting to 
note that the resettled German legionnaires named one of their townships on the cape ‘Hanover’: 
W.B. Tyler, ‘The British German Legion, 1854–62’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, liv (1976), p. 29.
91. Lord clarendon cited in J. Laband, ‘From Mercenaries to Military Settlers: The British 
German Legion, 1854–1861’, in S.M. Miller, ed., Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850–1918 (Leiden, 
2009), p.  121. cf. J.B. conacher, Britain and the Crimea, 1855–56: Problems of War and Peace 
(Basingstoke, 1987), pp. 134–5.
92. Emphasis in the original: Herbert Maxwell, ‘Our Allies at Waterloo’, Nineteenth Century, 
xlviii (1900), p.  410. The Hanoverian position at La Haye Sainte Farm did in fact form an 
integral part of British battlefield travelogues into the 1870s and 1880s. See The Lancaster Gazette 
Supplement, 29 Dec. 1875, ‘christmas Day on the Field of Waterloo’; The Ipswich Journal, 20 July 
1878, ‘The Eye church choir in Belgium’; The Leeds Mercury, 24 Jan. 1885, ‘Waterloo—A Visit 
to the Battlefield’.
93. Ernest Renan, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’ et autres écrits politiques (1882; Paris, 1995), p. 228.
94. Bismarck: Die Gesammelten Werke, Vib, ed. F. Thimme (2nd edn., Berlin, 1931), document 
1508, pp. 249–50 (Bismarck to count Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, 17 Feb. 1870); G. Schneider, 
‘Die Waterloogedenkfeier 1915’, Hannoversche Geschichtsblätter, xlv (2011), pp. 207–38; M. John, 
‘Liberalism and Society in Germany, 1850–1880: The case of Hanover’, ante, cii (1987), p. 589.
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memories have a habit of resurfacing when socio-political power 
relations change, or the readmission of particular memories is deemed 
to be useful.95 Unlike his predecessors, Kaiser Wilhelm ii was alive to the 
potential of Waterloo as a historical model, and initiated a controlled 
rehabilitation of Hanover’s English heritage in order to serve his 
personal diplomacy at the turn of the century. in doing so, he initially 
shuttled quite seamlessly between foreign, national and local audiences. 
in addressing the British public in September 1898, he carefully chose 
the evocative backdrop of the Waterloo column to maximise the effect 
of his congratulations to the victorious forces of his grandmother, 
Queen Victoria, in the Sudan. Some months later, he issued a ‘decree on 
tradition’ (Traditionserlass) for domestic consumption which appointed 
sixteen Prussian regiments and battalions as the ‘heirs’ to the Anglo-
Hanoverian units present at Waterloo. in addition to satisfying his 
emotional curiosity about the country of his revered grandmother—
and sealing a temporary rapprochement between Britain and Germany 
following from the Angola Treaty of August 1898—Wilhelm ii counted 
on this second symbolic gesture to soften lingering resistance towards 
Prussian state-building in Hanover.96
The Traditionserlass gave a strong demonstration of the ‘mass-
produced traditions’ that defined the Kaiser’s reign.97 Privately, members 
of the imperial entourage confessed that the blending of Prussian 
and Guelph military folklore had ‘absolutely nothing’ to do with the 
historic facts.98 in crucial contrast to the 1854 Foreign Enlistment Act, 
the far more manipulated reinvention of the KGL tradition did succeed 
in provoking a response. To show gratitude for the ‘relegitimisation’ of 
their past, veteran Hanoverian army officers presented the Kaiser with 
a miniature silver statue of the Waterloo column on the anniversary of 
the great battle in 1899.99 More importantly, bourgeois newspapers sided 
with the scandal-prone, impetuous monarch when he commended the 
Hanoverian and Prussian forces at Waterloo for having ‘saved the British 
army from destruction’ during the KGL centenary commemorations in 
1903. The Pall Mall Gazette warned that ‘[w]ords are arrows which 
95. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(2nd edn., London and New York, 1991), pp. 199–203.
96. Berlin-Lichterfelde, Bundesarchiv, R43/1403, fo. 151v, Prussian interior minister to the 
German chancellor, secret, 27 Aug. 1899; E. Schröder, Ein Tagebuch Kaiser Wilhelms II: 1888–
1902 nach Hof- und anderen Berichten (Breslau, 1903), p. 306. For a discussion of Wilhelm ii’s 
complicated relationship with England, see J.c.G. Röhl, ‘Der Kaiser und England’, in W. Rogasch, 
ed., Vicky & Albert, Vicky & The Kaiser (Ostfildern-Ruit, 1997), pp. 165–86. On the diplomatic 
context, see L. Reinermann, Der Kaiser in England: Wilhelm II. und sein Bild in der britischen 
Öffentlichkeit (Paderborn, 2001), p. 183; H. Rosenbach, Das Deutsche Reich, Grossbritannien und 
der Transvaal (1896–1902): Anfänge deutsch-britischer Entfremdung (Göttingen, 1993), pp. 91–114.
97. E. Hobsbawm, ‘Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–1914’, in id. and Ranger, eds., 
The Invention of Tradition, pp. 263–307.
98. R. von Zedlitz-Trützschler, Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof (Berlin and Leipzig, 1924), 
pp. 56–7.
99. Schneider, ‘...nicht umsonst gefallen’?, p. 168.
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fly fast and far in these days’, but the hostile reaction of the British 
media scarcely registered in Hanover, or, where it did, evinced little 
sympathy.100
The success of the Prusso-Hanoverian Waterloo myth and the 
simultaneous Anglo-Hanoverian estrangement stemmed from the 
convergence of two broad developments in the last thirty years of the 
nineteenth century. First, the British government’s renewed partisanship 
for Denmark in the Second Schleswig-Holstein War (1863–4), as 
German patriots saw it, and the foundation of the Kaiserreich at the 
end of the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) accelerated a process of 
national differentiation which was reflected in the politicisation of 
Waterloo monuments.101 The proliferation of German war memorials 
for the casualties of the Franco-Prussian War, combined with the good 
care of the existing Hanoverian cenotaphs at Waterloo, put British 
patriots on the spot. To pay their fallen compatriots the same respect, 
Lord Vivian, the minister at Brussels, raised money in 1887 through 
various subscriptions in the United Kingdom and Belgium for a new 
Waterloo memorial at Evère.102 The competitive nationalist spirit of 
battlefield statuomania had a snowball effect on the domestic political 
mass market, where the sponsorship and refurbishment of monuments 
were traded for patriotic prestige—with sometimes amusing results. 
An architect tasked by the German embassy to carry out repairs on 
the Hanoverian Monument found to his great surprise on visiting 
Waterloo in April 1909 that the work had already been completed by 
an agent of the duke of cumberland, the head of the deposed royal 
family of Hanover. The architect’s chagrin was only exceeded by the 
disappointment of the imperial government and the provincial diet 
of Hanover, after two years of budget negotiations for the planned 
restoration.103
Second, the process of national differentiation facilitated a 
reconfiguration of nationalism in both countries. Fears about the 
future, engendered by worries over the consequences of domestic 
reform and Britain’s increasingly precarious geopolitical situation, 
100. Pall Mall Gazette, 21 Dec. 1903, ‘The Unruly Member’. The Hanoverian socialists 
lampooned the supportive response of the bourgeois press in Volkswille, 22 Dec. 1903, p. 2, ‘Die 
Traditionsfeierlichkeiten’.
101. The deteriorating image of Britain in Hanoverian public opinion comes through clearly 
in the envoys’ reports to the Foreign Office. See Mösslang, Manias and Riotte, British Envoys to 
Germany, vol. iv, esp. pp. 261–2.
102. See correspondence relating to the monument at Evère in TNA, PRO, FO 10/655. 
On the ‘nationalisation’ of the Napoleonic Wars in Germany after 1871, note F.  Akaltin, Die 
Befreiungskriege im Geschichtsbild der Deutschen im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), 
pp. 119, 281. For details of the Prussian government’s maintenance of the German monuments at 
Waterloo, see Berlin, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, R 130489.
103. See correspondence relating to the restoration of the Hanoverian Monument (1907–11) 
in NHStA, Hann. 122a, Nr. 3468, fos. 199–201, 213–19, 220–22, 232, 242–3; Protokolle des 43. 
Hannoverschen Provinziallandtags (Hannover, 1909), third session, 12 March 1909, pp. 52–4.
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led a diverse coalition of politicians and intellectuals to propose the 
fusion of the British motherland with her white settler colonies in a 
vast political-economic unit akin to a global nation-state. The idea 
of ‘Greater Britain’ militated against indulgence of the old Anglo-
Hanoverian space of memory, as the army’s erstwhile dependence on 
auxiliaries from the continent detracted from ‘national efficiency’ in 
imperial defence.104 colonial rivalry also became a contributing factor 
in Germany, but the main reasons for the marginalisation of Hanover’s 
cosmopolitan history were sheer ignorance about British affairs and the 
rise of ‘homeland’ (Heimat) ideology from the 1880s.105 The Heimat 
banner, like ‘Greater Britain’ imperialism, mobilised a diverse array of 
activists, including environmentalists, proto-völkisch thinkers, agrarian 
anti-modernists, civil servants and liberal middle-class patriots, in 
defence of national ‘character’. This enabled heimatlers to construct 
mythic pasts that were only secondarily governed by rules of historical 
fact.106 Hanoverian heimatlers could thus in 1903  ‘re-remember’ 
their ancestors fighting with the Prussians to save the British army 
at Waterloo, instead of seeing them as subordinates of the duke of 
Wellington, and hence part of the British war effort.
At the same time the Heimat idea followed its own logic, which 
sometimes conflicted with the original intent of the Kaiser’s invented 
traditions. The failure to return the standards of the KGL to Hannover, 
after Wilhelm ii had ordered them to Berlin for his personal inspection, 
set off a hard-fought campaign in early 1900 for their release. The 
Hannoversche Anzeiger, the provincial capital’s largest daily newspaper, 
declared without hesitation that His Majesty’s inconsiderateness 
represented a ‘demonstration of unscrupulous centralisation’. The Kaiser 
eventually relented after Hannover’s magistrate had lodged an equally 
plain protest note with the military commander of the province.107 These 
passionate complaints were a potent display of bourgeois and municipal 
104. Northern Echo, 6 April 1900, ‘Foreign Legions’; D. Bell, ‘imagined Spaces: Nation, State, 
and Territory in the British colonial Empire, 1860–1914’, in W. Mulligan and B. Simms, eds., The 
Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660–2000: How Strategic Concerns Shaped Modern 
Britain (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 197–213; S. Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism, and Identity in 
Late Victorian Culture: Civil and Military Worlds (Basingstoke, 2003), pp. 45–8.
105. Media coverage of Britain decreased after the mid-century as official pre-censorship ceased 
and political commentators no longer used the United Kingdom as proxy for German issues 
they were not permitted to write about. in the late 1880s Hanover hosted an English-language 
weekly, The Anglo-American, but its target readership were expatriates rather than Hanoverians: 
R. Muhs, ‘Geisteswelten: Rahmenbedingungen des deutsch-britischen Kulturaustauschs im 19. 
Jahrhundert’, in id., J. Paulmann and W. Steinmetz, eds., Aneignung und Abwehr: Interkultureller 
Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert (Bodenheim, 1998), p. 61.
106. For a discussion of the historical malleability of the Heimat idea, see A. confino, Germany 
as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History (chapel Hill, Nc, 2006), 
pp. 57–80. cf. also G.S. Williamson, The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion and Aesthetic 
Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche (chicago, iL, 2004).
107. Hannoverscher Anzeiger, 7 Feb. 1900; see the collection of clippings from this and other 
Hanoverian dailies in Hannover, Stadtarchiv, HR 39, Nr. 133, and, in the same folder, Magistrate 
of Hannover to the office of the commander of the x Army corps, 24 Feb. 1900.
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self-assertion against the central government, which exposed cracks in 
the Prusso-Hanoverian consensus on the public commemoration of 
the Napoleonic Wars, and showed that local elites were willing to wrest 
political authority from the sovereign for the protection of their regional 
Heimat. Activism of this kind limited imperial interventions, yet also 
made it more difficult, ultimately, to imagine the KGL’s place in history 
other than from a heimatlich perspective.
As Britain and Germany moved into the First World War, the 
centennial of Waterloo, far from moderating belligerent rhetoric, 
cemented Anglo-Hanoverian estrangement. Though the anniversary 
‘necessarily pass[ed] very quietly’ in Britain, so as not to embarrass 
the French, The Times and the Daily Telegraph exploited the occasion 
to castigate Prussian militarism as a continuation of Napoleonic 
militarism—‘the negation of all law, of all treaties, and all rights’—
in order to cast their own nation now and then as the champion of 
liberty in Europe.108 Wellington’s German troops were glossed over or 
lumped with the militaristic Prussians. One officer, who still smarted 
from the Kaiser’s ‘determined effort to produce discord in the universal 
recognition of Wellington’s victory’ in 1903, took out his anger on 
Hanoverians in the United Service Magazine by harping on the alleged 
cowardice of the cumberland Hussars during the battle.109
Those slighted in this way repaid in kind, and on a much grander 
scale, for they did not have the feelings of allies to consider. in Hannover 
100,000 spectators gathered at the Waterloo column to remember 18 
June as a German victory won for the liberation of Europe. On the 
same day, the municipal Fatherland Museum opened a special Waterloo 
exhibition intended to highlight the commonality of purpose between 
the 1815 campaign and the present war, namely the fight, in the words 
of the curator, for the ‘fate of Europe, even the world, and above all the 
existence, future and honour of the German people, forever’. in keeping 
with the spirit of wartime Anglophobia, the centenary festivities played 
down the military role of Britain. in order to sidestep the nationally 
diverse composition of Wellington’s divisions, the Fatherland Museum 
commissioned a large diorama depicting the defence of La Haye Sainte 
Farm with the aim of recreating an exclusively Hanoverian moment 
of glory.110 And yet, even at this point, their historical entwinement 
locked the former allies in a dialogue of sorts. The claim made by the 
108. The Times, 18 June 1915, p. 9, ‘Waterloo’; Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1915, p. 8, ‘Waterloo’. 
See also T.c.W. Blanning, ‘18. Juni 1815: Waterloo’, in E.  François and U.  Puschner, eds., 
Erinnerungstage: Wendepunkte der Geschichte von Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 2010), 
p. 179.
109. R.H. Mackenzie, ‘Some Words on Wellington and Waterloo’, United Service Magazine, 
June 1915, p. 267. cf. also H. Belloc, ‘The Effect of Waterloo’, The Dublin Review, clvii (1915), p. 132.
110. W. Pessler, ‘Deutsche Waterloo-Erinnerungen im Vaterländischen Museum der Stadt 
Hannover’, Hannoversche Geschichtsblätter, xviii (1915), pp.  293–338; id., ‘Die Waterloo-
Jahrhundert-Ausstellung im Vaterländischen Museum der Stadt Hannover’, Hannoversche 
Geschichtsblätter, xviii (1915), pp. 389–416.
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exhibition’s organisers, that the ‘warlike spirit’ of the German warriors 
at Waterloo defeated Napoleon, was itself an implied rejoinder to 
the vilification of Prusso-German militarism by British propaganda. 
Moreover, the foreign distinctions and praise awarded to soldiers lost 
none of their symbolic capital as external confirmation of Hanoverian 
valour. ‘And when King Edward’s misguided heirs’, the Hannoverscher 
Courier prophesied, ‘will compare the accomplishments of the auxiliary 
peoples, whom they are employing against Germany in this war, with 
the services that German armies rendered them a hundred years ago, 
it is only to be expected that they will one day send the sorrowful cry 
across the channel: Germany, Germany, give me back your legions!’111 
in fact, by a twist of fate, Hanoverian regiments ended up doing the 
shouting across the wastelands of the Western Front as they taunted 
British regiments with the reminder that their ancestors had earned 
battle honours together once upon a time.112
in an interesting thought experiment, one scholar queried not long 
ago whether it is possible to extricate European lieux de mémoire 
such as Waterloo from their fundamental entwinement with national 
ideologies.113 The attempt to arrive at an ontological separation poses 
a major and perhaps ultimately unanswerable challenge. During the 
nineteenth century’s ‘age of nationalism’, sites of memory and historical 
events that held meaning for several countries invariably mirrored or 
reinforced particular nationalist forms of memory. To escape the barren 
conclusion that partisan agendas prevailed requires us to address the issue 
from the other end, by interrogating how transnational social spaces and 
associated collective memories impacted on national polities.114 in this 
vein, this article has made a case for the points of convergence between 
the memory cultures that the war effort against Napoleon forged in 
Britain and her one-time German dependency, Hanover. it examined 
initially the social settings of these encounters in order to elucidate key 
areas of overlap in the remembered war experience after 1815. charity 
helped British philanthropists relate to the continent in general and 
women in particular as fellow victims of the financial and psychological 
111. Hannoverscher Courier, 18 June 1915, no.  31834, evening edition, p.  5, ‘Besuch von 
Waterloo’. On the importance of external validation, see also Prof. Dr. Goebel, ‘Des Königs 
Deutsche Legion’, Hannoverland, ix (1915), p. 70.
112. M. Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle (Harmondsworth, 2000), p. 47.
113. S.B. Frandsen, ‘Schleswig: Ein Erinnerungsort für Deutsche und Dänen’, in Henningsen 
et al., eds., Transnationale Erinnerungsorte, p. 32. For a historiographical overview of the problems 
involved in trying to pinpoint European memory, see c.  cornelissen, ‘Die Nationalität von 
Erinnerungskulturen als ein gesamteuropäisches Phänomen’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und 
Unterricht, lxii (2011), pp. 5–16.
114. On this subject see also Jan Werner Müller, who pleads for further analysis of the 
correlation between national memory and international relations: J.W. Müller, ‘introduction: The 
Power of Memory, the Memory of Power and the Power over Memory’, in id., ed., Memory and 
Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past (cambridge, 2002), pp. 1–38.
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distress brought on by almost twenty-five years of uninterrupted 
warfare, just as the horizontal ties of ‘class’, professional respect, mutual 
political interests and the kinship of survivors maintained channels 
of communication among veteran officers. These were viable options 
because the invocation of Anglo-Hanoverian comradeship did not so 
much undercut as contribute to national pride and, in Hanover’s case, 
particularist state-building.
On a second axis, the discussion has charted the evolution of the 
memory of the Napoleonic era over a hundred-year period in order to 
explain the remarkable degree of Anglo-Hanoverian alienation evident 
by 1914. Philip Konigs insists (with a smidgen of deliberate hyperbole, 
to be sure) that the relationship with Hanover was simply ‘forgotten’ in 
London after 1837 and that the British share in the victories of Minden, 
Salamanca and Waterloo was conversely ‘more and more overlooked’ 
by Hanoverians.115 The evidence rather suggests a pragmatic dialectic 
between forgetting and reinvention of the Anglo-Hanoverian military 
heritage. it suited British parliamentarians to recall the services of their 
‘almost countrymen’ during the recruitment crisis of the crimean War; 
but, when that approach failed, the KGL’s image lapsed into nostalgic 
quaintness and, during the First World War, disregard. Across the 
channel the Prussian annexation of Hanover relegated the KGL to the 
sidelines of official commemorations until Kaiser Wilhelm ii’s ‘decree 
on tradition’ brought about a reintegration in 1899. Part of the imperial 
fascination with Hanover’s military traditions sprang from their 
Englishness, even if the fin de siècle realignment of national discourse 
and the Kaiser’s ambivalent Waterloo speech subsequently drowned 
out the dialogical undercurrent. Johannes Burkhardt’s conclusion that 
the Napoleonic Wars shaped the collective mindset of the German 
leadership in the First World War can only therefore be accepted with 
reservations, because the invoked historical continuities were of the 
Hohenzollern government’s own making, and nowhere more so than in 
Hanover, where the war of 1914–18 marked the culmination of a quite 
recent refashioning of collective allegiance.116
Since the end of the Second World War the Anglo-Hanoverian 
memory space has made a comeback on new terms. Diplomatic and 
political considerations have taken the place of invented traditions in a 
political conversation that has transcended the bilateral plane to become 
truly West European. During her state visit to the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1965, Queen Elizabeth ii ostentatiously abstained from 
laying a wreath at the Waterloo column so as not to offend French 
115. P. Konigs, The Hanoverian Kings and their Homeland: A Study of the Personal Union, 
1714–1837 (Lewes, 1993), pp. 168–9.
116. J. Burkhardt, ‘Kriegsgrund Geschichte? 1870, 1813, 1756—historische Argumente 
und Orientierungen bei Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges’, in id., J.  Becker, S.  Förster and 
G. Kronenbitter, eds., Lange und kurze Wege in den Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich, 1996), p. 81.
1434
EHR, cxxvii. 529 (Dec. 2012)
sensibilities. By way of compensation the British army sent six hundred 
bandsmen and pipers to entertain the Hanoverian public at the same 
venue for the one-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of Waterloo 
one month later. The reconciliatory, pan-European message of the 
symbolic act was not lost on the 50,000 spectators. ‘The occasion’, a 
correspondent of The Times mused, ‘was indeed one to stir a mixture 
of feelings—nostalgia for one’s own dashing military tradition now 
vanished, a genuine weakness for Britain rooted in Hanover’s past, and 
pride in the fact that the new Germany was now welcomed back as an 
ally and comrade in arms on an equal footing.’117 As the tercentennial 
of the dynastic union (2014) approaches, the ‘European dimension’ of 
the Anglo-Hanoverian connection will once more take centre-stage in 
a €5.5 million exhibition to be hosted by the state of Lower Saxony.118
To some the Europeanisation of collective memory may seem little 
more than a pragmatic dictate of political necessity to buttress EU 
integration; for others it is also a genuine opportunity to challenge 
old certainties about the past. Sir David Wilkie’s epic painting Chelsea 
Pensioners Reading the Gazette of the Battle of Waterloo (1822) throws into 
relief the potential for new insights even from sources that on the surface 
celebrate national achievement. Had Wilkie been concerned with the 
formative power of war in the making of Great Britain, as Linda colley 
asserts in her inquiry into the roots of British identity, then the presence 
in the image of a moustachioed Hanoverian legionnaire and a ‘negro 
of the band of Foot Guards, who was once servant to the celebrated 
Moreau, and accompanied him on his retreat through the Black Forest’ 
poses a paradox—unless it is assumed that the artist conceived the British 
national community in such broad terms as to encompass German 
‘almost countrymen’ and French deserters of slave descent.119 Entering 
into speculations upon whether Wilkie subscribed to such a view is 
beside the point, since the painting’s protagonists and composition attest 
more fundamentally to the diverse mobilisation of manpower, unity of 
purpose and transnational networks of memory that the wars of 1792–
1815 engendered among allies. These, rather than the sense of nostalgic 
loss perceived by Peter Fritzsche and others, may have emerged as the true 
long-term legacy of the nineteenth century’s new historical sensibility.
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